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CONFLATING STANDING AND THE MERITS 
UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT* 
ABSTRACT 
In American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot tall Latin cross honoring 
soldiers killed during World War I against an Establishment Clause 
challenge. In a concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch argued that the case 
should have been dismissed for lack of standing. He claimed that lower 
court decisions upholding standing for “offended observers” to challenge 
government religious displays are inconsistent with standing law, and were 
driven by the Supreme Court’s holding in Lemon v. Kurtzman that 
government endorsement of religion violated the Establishment Clause. 
Since, Gorsuch concluded, a majority of the Court explicitly disowned the 
Lemon test in American Legion, it was now time to abandon offended 
observer standing as well. 
In this Essay, I argue that Justice Gorsuch is correct, but for the wrong 
reasons. Justice Gorsuch’s assertion that offended observer standing arose 
from the Lemon endorsement test is not supported by history. He is, 
however, correct that such standing is recognized only in the Establishment 
Clause context. The question then arises, is there something unique about 
substantive law in this area which justifies special standing rules. And that 
in turn raises the very complex question of how the “injury in fact” 
requirement of standing doctrine interacts with substantive law. 
My conclusion is that substantive law and injury are related because 
Congress possesses the power to create new injuries that would not have 
supported common law claims, and that it regularly exercises that power in 
the administrative context. On the other hand, the Constitution, acting on 
its own, should not be read to create new forms of injury. This means that 
the cases recognizing standing to challenge religious display are incorrect, 
because they rely on the Establishment Clause alone to create injury where 
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none would have been recognized under the common law. The paper 
concludes by exploring the implications of this conclusion for the 
Establishment Clause, and for other areas of law. It ends with the important 
insight that if standing should not have been recognized in religious display 
cases, then the Supreme Court was also wrong to recognize standing in its 
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[S]tanding . . . often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.1 
 
[T]here is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry 
[about standing] turn on the source of the asserted right.2 
INTRODUCTION 
In American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n,3 the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot tall Latin cross, erected on 
public property in 1925 to honor soldiers killed during World War I,4 against 
an Establishment Clause challenge. The majority opinion by Justice Alito, 
writing for an unusual cross-ideological coalition of five Justices,5 relied 
primarily on history to uphold the cross—both the cross’s long pedigree and 
the specific history that, during World War I, made the cross the preeminent 
symbol of fallen American soldiers.6 As a doctrinal matter, the case will 
probably be remembered as the occasion when a majority of the Court 
finally fully interred the long-maligned three-part “test” for Establishment 
Clause cases announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman.7 This is because even 
though Justice Kagan refused to join those parts of Justice Alito’s opinion 
denouncing and abandoning Lemon,8 both Justice Thomas9 and Justice 
Gorsuch10 in their separate opinions concurring in the judgment 
unequivocally agreed that Lemon was incorrect, bringing to six the number 
 
1. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
2. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). 
3. 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). 
4. Id. at 2077. 
5. The opinion was joined in whole by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and 
Kavanaugh, and in most parts by Justice Kagan, supplying the fifth vote. 
6. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2082–87. 
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
8. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part). 
9. Id. at 2097–98 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
10. Id. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 











of the Justices voting to abandon Lemon. Justice Scalia’s “ghoul” appears 
to finally be dead for good.11 
The focus of this Essay, however, is not on the holding in American 
Legion, or (directly) on the demise of Lemon. It is rather on the argument 
that Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Thomas) made in his opinion 
concurring in the judgment, that the case should have been dismissed for 
lack of standing rather than decided on the merits.12 In brief, Justice Gorsuch 
argues that lower courts have granted standing, in cases challenging 
religious displays on government property, to individuals who are forced to 
regularly suffer “unwelcome direct contact” with such displays because 
those courts believed that the Lemon test, as interpreted in later cases, 
required this result.13 This is an anomaly because in no other area of law has 
the Court found “offense” alone to constitute injury-in-fact for standing 
purposes.14 With Lemon gone, he concludes, the Court can now reconcile 
standing in Establishment Clause cases with its broader standing doctrine.15 
Justice Gorsuch’s argument, drawn from an amicus brief filed by 
Michael McConnell on behalf of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,16 
is intriguing and at first fairly persuasive. He is, after all, quite correct that 
the Court has repeatedly rejected offense or hurt feelings alone as sufficient 
to establish Article III injury in other contexts.17 The ways in which Justice 
Gorsuch (and the Becket Fund) intertwine their standing argument with the 
test on the merits for Establishment Clause violations, however, raise some 
deep and difficult questions. Consider now the two quotes at the head of this 
Essay, both drawn from majority opinions by the Supreme Court in leading 
and often-cited standing cases (and in both of which the Court rejected 
standing). They are, of course, flatly contradictory. Can it be, as Justice 
Gorsuch argues, that a change in the substantive standard for evaluating 
Establishment Clause claims will also alter the universe of plaintiffs who 
have standing to bring such claims? Not according to Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Lujan, but perhaps under Justice Powell’s opinion in Warth. So 
who is right? I will argue here that neither is exactly right (though the Lujan 
 
11. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the Lemon test as “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie 
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried”). 
12. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
13. Id. at 2098–2101 (quoting Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning 
Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2017)). 
14. Id. at 2098. 
15. Id. at 2102. 
16. Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717), 2018 WL 6819439 [hereinafter “Becket Fund Brief”]. 
17. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 754–55 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 












quote, written in Justice Scalia’s typically forceful language, is probably 
more clearly wrong than the one from Warth). And ultimately, I will argue 
that while Justice Gorsuch is probably correct that what he calls “offended 
observer”18 standing in religious display cases is inappropriate, it is not 
because of the recent change in substantive law. Rather, such standing was 
always inappropriate. 
Part I summarizes current standing doctrine and discusses the 
relationship between substantive law and the doctrine’s requirement of an 
“injury in fact.” Part II describes the basis and current status of “offended 
observer” or “unwelcome direct contact” standing in religious display cases 
in the lower courts, including an extant circuit split on the issue, as well as 
Justice Gorsuch’s objections to such standing in American Legion. Part III 
considers whether the Establishment Clause should be understood to create 
Article III standing for “offended observers” challenging religious displays, 
and what the consequences of denying such standing are for government 
religious displays. Finally, Part IV will consider the broader implications of 
rejecting “offended observer” standing, both for Establishment Clause 
litigation, and for other areas of standing law. 
I. STANDING AND SUBSTANCE 
Though standing doctrine has its roots in decisions going back to the 
1930s,19 the modern doctrine began to emerge in Justice Douglas’s 1970 
opinion in Ass’n of Data Processing Services Organizations v. Camp20 
interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act. Over the subsequent two 
decades or so, the Supreme Court formalized the doctrine, holding that to 
establish standing, a “plaintiff21 must allege personal injury fairly traceable 
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by 
the requested relief.”22 These requirements, the Court has said, are 
constitutional and derive from the language of Article III limiting the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.”23 As such, 
standing is nonwaivable and jurisdictional. One consequence of this 
analysis, however, is that standing is not constitutionally required in 
tribunals other than Article III federal courts, such as administrative 
tribunals and (crucially, as we shall see24) state courts. 
 
18. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
19. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341–45 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
20. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
21. And also, we later learned, defendants appealing adverse judgments. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). 
22. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
23. Id. at 750–51. 
24. See infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 











The three elements of standing (injury, causation, and redressability) are 
now well established and have been elucidated in a huge number of cases. 
Regarding the injury (or as later cases would have it, “injury in fact”) 
requirement in particular, the Lujan Court clarified that the injury must be 
“concrete and particularized” as well as “actual or imminent.”25 More 
recently, we have learned that plaintiffs may not “manufacture standing 
merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical 
future harm.”26 In other regards, however, the Court has notably failed to 
define what precisely constitutes a requisite “injury.” 
One area where the Court has been particularly unclear is the relationship 
between cognizable injuries and the underlying substantive law under which 
a claim has been brought. Ironically, the case in which the Court has 
considered (and muddled) this question most thoroughly is Lujan. The 
second opening quote above, from Lujan, suggests that there should be no 
relationship at all between injury and substantive law. Just two pages later, 
however, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion acknowledges that Congress 
may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto 
injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”27 And in an important and 
influential concurring opinion in Lujan, Justice Kennedy made the point that 
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation 
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”28 
Thus clearly the Lujan Court is acknowledging some connection between 
standing and substance, but is quite unclear on what that is. 
The Court returned to this question a few years later, in Federal Election 
Commission v. Akins.29 In that case, a group of voters sued the Federal 
Election Commission, seeking an order requiring the FEC to regulate the 
American Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC) as a “political 
committee,” which would have required AIPAC to disclose substantial 
information about itself.30 The Commission refused, and the plaintiffs 
sought judicial review. The Court only addressed the standing issue in the 
case: whether the plaintiffs’ inability to obtain information that would assist 
them to evaluate candidates for political office constituted injury in fact. 
The majority held that it did because the plaintiffs’ desire for the 
information was “concrete,” and Congress, “intending to protect voters such 
as [plaintiffs] from suffering the kind of injury here at issue, intended to 
authorize this kind of suit.”31 
 
25. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
26. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013). 
27. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
28. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
29. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
30. Id. at 16, 21. 












The Court recently wrestled with this same dilemma in Spokeo v. Robins, 
in which an individual brought suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
against a “people search engine” which reported substantial inaccurate 
information about the plaintiff.32 The issue the Court faced was whether the 
reporting of inaccurate information alone established standing. Quoting the 
two statements from Lujan regarding congressional authority, the Court 
noted that Congress has a special role to play in recognizing and elevating 
to cognizable status “intangible” injuries.33 Nonetheless, the Court 
concluded that the plaintiff, Robins, could not establish a “concrete” injury 
merely by showing that Spokeo spread false information about him; he also 
had to show that that information caused him “harm.”34 The Court did not, 
however, define what “harm” meant, or why Congress could not create a 
right, in itself, for individuals not to have falsehoods spread about them.35 
The uncertainty in the Court’s jurisprudence in this area thus persists. 
Before proceeding to the specific issue of standing analysis in religious 
display cases, it is useful to briefly consider three relatively early standing 
cases that are relevant to that analysis. The first two, decided on the same 
day in 1974, concern standing to enforce structural constitutional 
provisions. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,36 a 
group of reserve military officers sued to enforce the Incompatibility Clause 
of the Constitution, which forbids members of Congress from “holding any 
Office under the United States.”37 Their claim was that the reserve military 
commissions held by some members of Congress violated this clause. The 
Court dismissed for lack of standing, holding that plaintiffs, suing in their 
capacity as citizens, had not suffered any concrete injury as a consequence 
of the alleged Incompatibility Clause violation, other than to their abstract 
desire to have the government comply with the Constitution.38 Importantly, 
the Court rejected the argument (accepted by the District Court) that the 
Incompatibility Clause itself was designed to protect against the injury 
plaintiffs alleged, holding that this was insufficient to create concrete 
injury.39 And it further dismissed the District Court’s concern that if 
plaintiffs lacked standing then no one would be able to enforce the 
Incompatibility Clause, on the grounds that “[o]ur system of government 
leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes.”40 
 
32. 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016). 
33. Id. at 1549. 
34. Id. at 1550. 
35. Id. 
36. 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
37. Id. at 209–10 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2). 
38. Id. at 222–23. 
39. Id. at 224. 
40. Id. at 227. 











United States v. Richardson41 raised a distinct and more difficult issue 
than Schlesinger. There, a taxpayer brought suit challenging a statutory 
provision which permitted the CIA to refuse to disclose its detailed 
expenditures, on the grounds that this practice violated the Accounts Clause 
of the Constitution.42 The Court again denied standing, finding that there 
was no “logical nexus” between Richardson’s identity as a taxpayer and his 
desire to obtain information about CIA spending.43 The “logical nexus” test 
derived from the Court’s decision in Flast v. Cohen,44 where the Court did 
recognize taxpayer standing to challenge legislative appropriations as 
violating the Establishment Clause. Flast remains the only instance where 
the Court has recognized taxpayer standing, another example of 
Establishment Clause exceptionalism in the standing area. Finally, as in 
Schlesinger, the Court specifically noted that the fact that its holding meant 
no one could sue to enforce the Accounts Clause was irrelevant, because 
that simply meant that “the subject matter is committed to the surveillance 
of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”45 
There are two points about Richardson that are worthy of further 
attention. First, note that under the Richardson and Flast “logical nexus” 
test, determination of standing does require some attention to the 
substantive issue in the case. However, it does not merge the analysis 
completely—perhaps because Flast was creating a deliberately narrow 
exception to the general rule rejecting taxpayer standing. Indeed, in an 
influential concurring opinion in Richardson Justice Powell specifically 
criticized this aspect of Flast, and proposed to abandon it (albeit he would 
have adhered to the specific holding in Flast on stare decisis grounds).46 
Second, there is an obvious tension between Richardson and Akins, in that 
both cases involved citizens suing to obtain information of general, political 
relevance, yet the Court found standing in Akins, but not Richardson. The 
Akins Court reconciled the cases on the grounds that Richardson involved 
enforcement of a structural constitutional provision, while in Akins 
Congress had specifically granted voters a right to the information at issue.47 
We will come back to the significance of this holding later.48  
The third significant case, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,49 involved the Establishment 
 
41. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“[A] regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and 
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”). 
43. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 174–75. 
44. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
45. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. 
46. Id. at 180–81 (Powell, J., concurring). 
47. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21–23 (1998). 
48. See infra notes 101–104 and accompanying text. 












Clause. The plaintiffs, relying on Flast v. Cohen, challenged the transfer of 
real property from the federal government to a religious college.50 The Court 
denied standing, limiting Flast to challenges to legislative appropriations of 
money, not property transfers that have no direct effect on government 
taxing or spending,51 and finding that plaintiffs could point to no concrete, 
personalized injury necessary to establish citizen standing.52 In so holding, 
the Court reaffirmed that constitutional provisions, including the 
Establishment Clause, do not create a “personal constitutional right” to a 
government that complies with the Constitution.53 The Court closed its 
analysis by quoting Schlesinger for the principle that “[t]he assumption that 
if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not 
a reason to find standing.”54 
In short, some aspects of standing law, such as the basic three-element 
test, as well as the principle that the lack of any other available plaintiffs is 
not a reason to recognize standing for a particular plaintiff, are by now 
extremely well established. Other aspects of the doctrine, however, notably 
the relationship between the definition of a cognizable injury and 
underlying, substantive law, remain very much in flux. In closing it should 
be noted that on the latter question, neither extreme solution can be correct, 
given current law. It cannot be that the very existence of a legal requirement 
creates a right to that requirement being enforced, such that denial of such 
a “right” constitutes injury in fact, because in such a world standing doctrine 
does no work separate from the merits. All legal violations would produce 
plaintiffs with standing; yet in cases like Schlesinger and Richardson, the 
Court denied standing even though the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits were 
very strong. And there are of course innumerable cases where litigants 
clearly have standing because they are subjected to coercive regulations, but 
lose on the merits in challenging such regulations. On the other hand, it 
cannot be that there is no connection between substantive law and injury, 
because that would leave unexplained the vast increase in the scope of 
litigation and litigable injuries under the administrative state. Cases like 
Akins and dozens of others involving litigation of administrative statutes, as 
well as the various dicta in Lujan, clearly establish that Congress has some 
 
50. Id. at 478–79. 
51. Id. at 480. The Court has subsequently limited Flast even further, rejecting taxpayer standing 
to challenge executive branch funding decisions in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 
551 U.S. 587 (2007), and to challenge tax credits granted to religious entities in Arizona Christian School 
Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011). 
52. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485–86. 
53. Id. at 483 (quoting Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
54. Id. at 489 (alteration in original) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 
418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)). 











authority to make actionable injuries that would not have supported a 
common law lawsuit. 
Indeed, in the constitutional realm, the Supreme Court’s affirmative 
action jurisprudence clearly links standing and the merits. In its 1978 Bakke 
decision, for example, the Court held that Bakke had standing to challenge 
an affirmative action program at a public medical school even though he 
could not demonstrate that he would have been admitted to the medical 
school absent the program.55 The Court’s explanation was that Bakke’s 
injury could be found “in the University’s decision not to permit Bakke to 
compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race.”56 
Following up on this, in Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated 
General Contractors v. City of Jacksonville,57 the Court permitted a 
contractors’ association to challenge a minority set-aside program for 
government contracts despite its inability to show that the program had 
actually deprived any member of the association of a contract. Again, the 
Court’s logic was that in this situation, the relevant injury in fact was “the 
denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not 
the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”58 The results in these cases, 
finding injury simply in denial of “equal treatment” with no tangible loss, is 
simply inconceivable outside the Equal Protection sphere. Indeed, in Lujan 
itself the Court specifically held that denial of procedure alone, absent an 
underlying concrete injury, did not satisfy Article III.59 It is hard to see what 
the difference is between being denied the ability to participate equally in 
an admissions or contracting process, and the denial of process in Lujan, 
unless the Equal Protection Clause itself is understood to grant citizens a 
right to be treated equally, such that denial of that right alone constitutes 
injury in fact. 
II. ENDORSEMENT AND OFFENDED OBSERVERS 
Returning now to the problem of religious displays, as Justice Gorsuch 
notes in his concurrence in the American Legion case, the plaintiffs 
challenging the cross monument claimed injury because they “regularly” 
came into “direct contact” with the cross in their personal lives.60 As he also 
correctly notes, this “direct contact” theory of standing, which Justice 
 
55. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978). 
56. Id. 
57. 508 U.S. 656 (1993). 
58. Id. at 666. 
59. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–78 (1992). 
60. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2098 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (quoting Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 874 












Gorsuch labels “offended observer” standing, 61 has been widely accepted 
in the lower courts.62 In a much-cited opinion by Judge Wilkinson, the 
Fourth Circuit nicely explains the theory behind such standing.63 The 
plaintiff in that case, Richard Suhre, was challenging a Ten Commandments 
display in a local courthouse, which Suhre regularly came into unwanted 
contact with because of his litigious nature.64 The court reversed the District 
Court’s dismissal of the litigation on standing grounds, finding that Suhre’s 
contact with the display did cause him injury in fact. The opinion begins by 
noting that “the standing inquiry in Establishment Clause cases has been 
tailored to reflect the kind of injuries Establishment Clause plaintiffs are 
likely to suffer,”65 which are likely to implicate the “spiritual, value-laden 
beliefs of the plaintiffs” rather than tangible harm.66 With respect to 
religious display cases in particular, Judge Wilkinson explains that the 
relevant injury is caused by “unwelcome direct contact with a religious 
display that appears to be endorsed by the state.”67 Wilkinson traces this 
principle to the Supreme Court’s leading 1963 decision in School District 
of Abington Township v. Schempp in which the Court held that school 
children and their parents had standing to challenge Bible readings in public 
schools because they were “directly affected” by the readings (and 
ultimately, of course, held that such readings violate the Establishment 
Clause).68 And importantly, the Suhre opinion clarifies that the source of 
such standing is not abstract “offense” (pace Justice Gorsuch), but rather 
being made to feel a religious outsider when such endorsement occurs 
within one’s own community, and especially in public facilities.69 
In his analysis, Judge Wilkinson drew on an Establishment 
Clause/standing case from the Eleventh Circuit written by another highly 
respected judge, Frank M. Johnson. In Saladin v. City of Milledgeville the 
plaintiffs were challenging a city seal containing the word “Christianity.”70 
Here too, the court held that plaintiffs’ “direct contact” with the seal made 
them “feel like second class citizens,” and that this was enough to create 
injury in fact.71 Judge Wilkinson’s “direct contact” approach, followed by 
 
61. Id. at 2098. Carl Esbeck has argued, somewhat convincingly, that the theory is better labeled 
“unwanted exposure” standing. Carl H. Esbeck, Unwanted Exposure to Religious Expression by 
Government: Standing and the Establishment Clause, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 607 (2013). 
62. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
63. Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997). 
64. Id. at 1084–85. 
65. Id. at 1086. 
66. Id. (quoting ACLU of Ga. v. Rabun Cty. Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098, 1102 (11th 
Cir. 1983)). 
67. Id. 
68. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963). 
69. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086–87. 
70. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 688–89 (11th Cir. 1987). 
71. Id. at 692–93. 











the lower court in American Legion, thus was not an aberration. To the 
contrary, to this day most of the circuit courts of appeals continue to 
recognize standing in Establishment Clause cases based on direct contact 
with religious displays.72 
This is not to say that the circuits are unanimous in how they apply 
standing doctrine in these cases. In the Suhre litigation, Judge Wilkinson 
also noted that there is an ongoing circuit split over the exact requirements 
of “direct contact” standing. Some circuits require that plaintiffs 
encountering unwelcome religious displays change their conduct or 
behavior to avoid such displays.73 As the Suhre court also notes, however, 
the majority of circuits to consider this question have rejected such a 
requirement, holding that unwanted, direct contact alone is sufficient to 
establish standing (a position that the Suhre court also adopted, concluding 
that to make putative plaintiffs give up access to public facilities to establish 
standing would add “‘insult’ to the existing ‘injury’ requirement.”).74 This 
circuit split, which continues to exist, has been widely reported and 
described in the academic commentary.75 Ultimately, however, it does not 
bear directly on the primary concern of this Essay, which is whether “direct 
contact” standing is consistent with Article III.76 
Let us now return to Justice Gorsuch and American Legion. Much of 
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion argues that outside of the Establishment Clause 
context, offense at government conduct alone has consistently been held 
insufficient to establish injury in fact because such a theory would permit 
any government action to be challenged by any citizen.77 In this he is of 
course correct, as illustrated by Schlesinger and Richardson. He also argues 
 
72. See, e.g., Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 353–54 (5th Cir. 2017); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. 
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 859 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2017); Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. 
New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 479 (3d Cir. 2016); Jewish People for the Betterment 
of Westhampton Beach v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 778 F.3d 390, 394 (2d Cir. 2015); Red River 
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that what he calls “offended observer,” but lower courts call “direct 
contact,” standing is unique to the Establishment Clause, and inconsistent 
with the broader standing doctrine.78 This assertion is more contestable. 
Indeed, Judge Wilkinson specifically rejected the latter argument on the 
grounds that the outsider status created by government endorsement of 
religion does not constitute mere “offense.”79 Regardless, whether or not 
Justice Gorsuch is correct to label this form of standing an illegitimate type 
of Establishment Clause exceptionalism is the subject of Part III, which we 
can table.80 For now what should interest us is why Justice Gorsuch believes 
this unquestionably unusual, and in his view illegitimate, form of standing 
came to be recognized. 
According to Justice Gorsuch, the guilty party was Lemon v. Kurtzman 
(or rather, the Supreme Court itself, in creating the now-discredited Lemon 
test).81 Lemon held that in order to comply with the Establishment Clause, 
government action “must have a secular . . . purpose . . . [I]ts principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, . . . 
[and it] must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”82 Later cases, Justice Gorsuch accurately notes, interpreted 
Lemon to condemn government conduct that a “reasonable observer” would 
see as “endorsing” religion.83 This, Justice Gorsuch argues, led lower courts 
to conclude that endorsement alone must permit a reasonable observer to 
sue.84 
Is Judge Gorsuch justified in tying direct-contact standing to Lemon and 
the endorsement test? It is true that in Judge Wilkinson’s 1997 Suhre 
opinion the court does tie the injury caused by direct contact to government 
endorsement,85 and in a 2017 Fifth Circuit opinion (not involving a religious 
display) the court explicitly tied direct-contact standing in Establishment 
Clause cases to the endorsement test.86 These in fact are the two citations 
 
78. Id. at 2100–01, 2103. 
79. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Jessie Hill has described the harm at issue in such 
cases as “expressive harm,” and analogized it to the harm created by racial segregation. Note, Expressive 
Harms and Standing, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1329–30 (1999). My own view is that de jure racial 
segregation, because it directly impinges on the physical liberty of individuals, fits more easily into 
traditional common law definitions of injury. 
80. As noted earlier, the form of taxpayer standing recognized in Flast v. Cohen undoubtedly is 
a form of Establishment Clause exceptionalism in standing doctrine, somewhat strengthening Justice 
Gorsuch’s claim. 
81. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2101. 
82. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
83. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620–21 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
84. Id.  
85. Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997). 
86. Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2017). 











that Justice Gorsuch (and Michael McConnell’s Becket Fund brief that he 
was relying upon) provides for that proposition.87 The problem is that 
Justice Gorsuch’s timeline does not quite work. The Lemon test in its 
original form seems to have no connection to direct-contact standing. The 
“endorsement” reading of Lemon, under which the first two prongs ask 
whether the challenged government action had the purpose or effect of 
endorsing religion, first appeared in 1984 in Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion (for herself alone) in Lynch v. Donnelly,88 in which the Court upheld 
the inclusion of a crèche as part of a Christmas display on public property. 
It was not adopted by a majority of the Court until five years later, however, 
in the 1989 County of Allegheny decision.89 Yet Judge Johnson’s crucial 
decision recognizing “direct contact” standing in Saladin was issued in 
1987, two years before County of Allegheny. And Saladin in turn relied upon 
the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier Rabun decision from 1983—i.e., before the 
endorsement test had even been articulated. Rabun struck down a large 
lighted cross in a state park, and found standing based on plaintiffs’ physical 
contact with the cross which affected their ability to use the park.90 And as 
Rabun in turn recognizes, the D.C. Circuit had in fact found standing to 
challenge a religious display as early as 1970, before even Lemon had been 
decided!91 Obviously, the standing story is more complex than the simple 
causality from Lemon to endorsement to “offended observer” standing 
claimed by Justice Gorsuch. 
Nonetheless, there is clearly truth to Justice Gorsuch’s assertion that 
there is a link between the substantive law of the Establishment Clause, and 
the willingness of the lower courts to grant standing based on direct contact 
with religious displays (with or without a requirement of additional actions 
by plaintiffs). In Lynch, Justice O’Connor explicitly tied her newly minted 
“endorsement” test to the concern that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community.”92 Building on this, in finding standing Judge Johnson’s 
Saladin opinion undoubtedly does rely upon the idea that “the City’s 
endorsement of Christianity . . . makes the appellants feel like second class 
citizens.”93 And the en banc Ninth Circuit has gone even further, finding 
standing to challenge a San Francisco Board of Supervisors’ resolution 
 
87. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); Becket Fund Brief, 
supra note 16, at 32–33. 
88. 465 U.S. 668, 688–690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
89. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989). This portion of Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion was joined by a majority of the Court. 
90. ACLU v. Rabun Cty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1105–08 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(per curiam). 
91. Id. at 1105 (citing Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
92. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 












condemning the actions of the Catholic Church without any evidence of 
“direct contact” on the part of the plaintiff, because “the psychological 
consequence [of the Board’s adoption of the resolution] was exclusion or 
denigration on a religious basis within the political community.”94 
Justice Gorsuch is also clearly correct that the form of “outsider status” 
standing recognized in the “direct contact” cases is unique to the 
Establishment Clause. In particular, the result reached in the Ninth Circuit 
case just described is simply inconceivable outside the Establishment 
Clause context. After all, the government speaks on nonreligious issues all 
the time in ways that can make significant portions of the population feel 
like outsiders; indeed, that seems to be the main function of President 
Trump’s Twitter account, which the White House has stated is “official.”95 
Yet no one believes that this creates standing for victims to challenge that 
speech. Finally, in the Moore v. Bryant case cited by Justice Gorsuch,96 the 
court relied upon the different purposes of the Establishment Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause to deny standing to a lawyer who was challenging 
the inclusion of the Confederate battle flag in the Mississippi state flag.97 In 
particular, the court distinguished the Establishment Clause “direct contact” 
standing cases because the “Establishment Clause prohibits the Government 
from endorsing a religion . . . . [but] the gravamen of an equal protection 
claim is differential government treatment, not differential government 
messaging.”98 
In short, whatever the relationship between the Lemon or endorsement 
tests and direct-contact standing, there is no question that the lower court 
decisions recognizing such standing rely upon their substantive 
understanding of the demands of the Establishment Clause. We now turn to 
the question of whether this reliance is consistent with the broader scope of 
Article III standing doctrine. 
III. CREATING INJURY 
Based on the discussion so far, it seems clear that the theory behind the 
many decisions recognizing direct-contact standing is that even though in 
general feelings of hurt or exclusion do not constitute “injury in fact” for 
standing purposes, the Establishment Clause does make such injuries 
 
94. Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 
1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
95. Elizabeth Landers, White House: Trump’s Tweets Are ‘Official Statements,’ CNN (June 6, 
2017, 4:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-official-statements/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/5AL4-9X8M]. 
96. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
97. Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2017). 
98. Id. (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)). 











actionable because its very purpose is to prevent religious divisiveness and 
the political exclusion of non-adherents to the state’s favored religion. As 
we noted, the Court has long recognized some link between standing and 
substantive law.99 Furthermore, in the Lujan case itself—the primary 
citation for the contrary position—the majority recognized that Congress 
may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto 
injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”100 Justice Kennedy’s 
arguably-controlling concurring opinion in that case went even further, 
stating that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains 
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.”101 These pronouncements, coming from a decision that is arguably 
the most hostile to standing in modern history, clearly recognize some 
ability for substantive law to create injuries not recognized traditionally by 
common law courts. They thus provide some support for direct-contact 
standing. 
But now a pause is necessary, because if substantive law always is 
sufficient to create injury then, as noted earlier, the law of standing 
disappears and cases like Schlesinger, Richardson, and Valley Forge (to say 
nothing of dozens of other cases denying standing despite strong claims on 
the merits) must be wrong. Perhaps the answer is that while substantive law 
can create injury, there is still a minimum level of “concreteness” required, 
so that purely general, ideological injury will not suffice. Such a principle 
can explain Schlesinger and Valley Forge, because in both cases the 
plaintiffs were not in any way directly and personally confronted or affected 
by the allegedly unconstitutional government conduct. But it cannot explain 
Richardson, in which the plaintiffs personally sought specific information 
that was of undoubted value to them. And it cannot explain how Richardson 
can be reconciled with Akins, where a desire to obtain information was 
recognized as injury in fact. 
The answer to this conundrum can be found in Akins itself. Perhaps, as 
Akins strongly suggests, the substantive law that can recognize/create new 
injuries must stem from Congress (and perhaps state legislatures), not the 
Constitution itself. In the era of the administrative state, in which statutes 
and regulations authorized by statutes do enormous amounts of work that 
would have been inconceivable in the pre-modern era, it makes sense for 
Congress to also have the power to make actionable injuries that flow from 
 
99. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
100. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). 












violations of this new legal regime.102 Such a power is a rational element of 
Congress’s authority to make laws that are “necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [granted to Congress], and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”103 Indeed, without such a 
power much of modern administrative litigation since the 1960s is 
inexplicable.104 
The Constitution, however, is arguably different. When the Constitution 
was drafted and adopted from 1787 to 1789, when the First Amendment 
was proposed and ratified from 1789 to 1791, and when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was proposed and ratified from 1865 to 1868, the legal 
background was radically different from today. Courts were common law 
courts, and civil litigation was overwhelmingly common law litigation. And 
thus the kinds of interests asserted in civil litigation were interests protected 
by the common law. Constitutional issues, when they arose (which was 
rarely), were typically litigated as defenses to or elements of common law 
claims.105 From this background, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
Constitution itself does not create injuries or judicially enforceable legal 
rights; it rather provides substantive law to be applied when a more 
traditional legal claim is adjudicated. 
If this is true, then the cases recognizing direct-contact standing to bring 
Establishment Clause challenges are clearly incorrectly decided. As 
discussed extensively in the first two Parts of this Essay, in no other context 
do courts treat offense, feelings of exclusion, or unwelcome contact alone 
as sufficient to create injury. And certainly the common law would not have 
recognized any such actionable right. Perhaps Congress, under its Section 5 
power to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, could create such an injury 
 
102. I set aside the fraught question, arguably underlying the dispute in Lujan, of whether there 
are any limits on Congress’s power in this regard, because while of great interest, it is not relevant to the 
primary issue I address. 
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
104. Examples include the statutory right of radio and television audience members to challenge 
the Federal Communications Commission’s licensing decisions, see Office of Commc’n of the United 
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and rights of those who enjoy the environment 
to challenge projects that would degrade it. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) 
(“We do not question that this type of harm [aesthetic injury] may amount to an ‘injury in fact’ sufficient 
to lay the basis for standing . . . .”); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 
1965). Indeed, in Lujan itself Justice Scalia commented that “[o]f course, the desire to use or observe 
an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for [the] purpose 
of standing.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63 (emphasis added). Yet the inability to view endangered animals 
one does not own, like the other interests described above, surely were not interests protected at the 
common law. 
105. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (resolving constitutionality of Missouri 
Compromise in actions for assault); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (resolving 
Contracts Clause issue raised in an action for trover). 











or right, at least against state and local governments.106 But if it has not done 
so, the Establishment Clause on its own cannot make actionable an injury 
that would not traditionally have been recognized as such. 
This principle, if accepted, might also explain why some courts of 
appeals do not permit standing based purely on direct contact with religious 
displays, but also require proof that plaintiffs altered their behavior to avoid 
the offending display.107 Such additional steps arguably infringe on 
traditional liberty interests in a way that direct contact alone does not. After 
all, surely the common law would have treated as injury a citizen’s physical 
exclusion from public property open to the public at large.108 The difficulty 
is that in Clapper v. Amnesty International U.S.A.,109 the Court rejected 
essentially this argument. It held that absent an underlying injury in fact, 
actions that plaintiffs voluntarily take to avoid perceived (but 
nonactionable) harm do not constitute injury for standing purposes.110 The 
reason, the Court stated, was that “[plaintiffs] cannot manufacture standing 
merely by inflicting harm on themselves . . . . If the law were otherwise, an 
enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower standard for Article 
III standing simply by making an expenditure . . . .”111 And this must be 
correct. Just as Richardson could not have “manufactured” standing for 
himself by exerting efforts to obtain information about the CIA’s 
expenditures (which in fact he did do112), so plaintiffs cannot create standing 
by voluntarily avoiding a display that does not itself cause them cognizable 
injury (it would, of course, be a different matter if a plaintiff were legally 
excluded from government property or legally compelled to observe the 
offending display). 
Finally, we are confronted with the argument that if direct-contact 
plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge religious displays then no one 
will have standing, making them effectively immune from constitutional 
review. This argument was made by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in 
American Legion—though she did so by conflating standing and the 
merits.113 It was made by an amicus brief on behalf of Law Professors in 
 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The reason, of course, is that the Establishment Clause applies 
against the states and their components only because it has been “incorporated” into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
107. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
108. Whether such exclusion would have been found invalid is another matter. See 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895) (Holmes, J.). 
109. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
110. Id. at 416. 
111. Id. 
112. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 168 (1974). 
113. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2105 n.3 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that if Justice Gorsuch’s standing argument was accepted, then statements by Justice 
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, recognizing that some religious displays are 












American Legion, authored by Chris Lund (and cited by Justice 
Ginsburg).114 And it has been made by a number of scholars in defense of 
current standing rules.115 There is, however, an obvious response to this. In 
Schlesinger, Richardson, and Valley Forge, the Court pointed out that “[t]he 
assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have 
standing, is not a reason to find standing.”116 The reason, as the Richardson 
Court explained, is that the lack of plaintiffs with standing simply means 
that “the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and 
ultimately to the political process.”117 
The implications of the above analysis are clear. Because of a lack of 
plaintiffs with standing, government religious displays (at least outside the 
school context118) are not generally subject to federal judicial scrutiny under 
the Establishment Clause. One possibility is that such disputes might be 
resolved primarily in state courts, who are after all not bound to Article III 
standing rules. This, however, strikes me as a relatively unlikely outcome 
in most instances. For one thing, even though not bound by Article III many 
state courts do follow some version of standing rules, often modeled upon 
the Article III rules created by the Supreme Court.119 In addition, for the 
reasons famously identified by Chief Justice Marshall and Burt Neuborne, 
there are reasons to think that state court judges, especially in states where 
government-sponsored religious displays are common, are likely to be 
hostile to federal constitutional claims against such displays.120 
As a consequence, in practice absent plaintiffs with Article III standing 
disputes over government religious displays will usually be relegated to 
what Larry Kramer has called “popular constitutionalism,”121 and what 
Steven D. Smith, speaking specifically about standing and the 
 
114. Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6–7, Am. Legion, 139 
S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717), 2019 WL 582080, at *6–7 [hereinafter “Law Professors Brief”]. 
115. See, e.g., John M. Bickers, Standing on Holy Ground: How Rethinking Justiciability Might 
Bring Peace to the Establishment Clause, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 446 (2012); Esbeck, supra note 61, 
at 618–19, 624, 647–48; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from 
Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, BYU L. REV. 115, 119 
(2008); Merav Bennett, Comment, Standing for Statues, but Not for Statutes? An Argument for Purely 
Sigmatic Harm Standing Under the Establishment Clause, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1563, 1576 (2019). 
116. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 
489 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 
208, 227 (1974)); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. 
117. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. 
118. The question of why the school context might make a difference is explored in Part IV.  
119. Calvin Massey, Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal Review, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 
401, 402–04 (2015). 
120. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 1105 (1977). 
121. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 











Establishment Clause, calls the “soft constitution.”122 Enforcement of the 
Establishment Clause in this context (though by no means all contexts, as 
discussed in Part IV) would be left primarily to constitutional politics, in 
which participants can and should consider constitutional values, but 
ultimately resolve the disputed issues through compromise and some 
geographic variation.123 It might be remembered in this regard that 
Madison’s famous Memorial and Remonstrance opposing taxation to 
support religion, which deeply influenced the Flast Court’s decision to find 
taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause,124 was addressed to the 
Virginia legislature, not to the courts.125 
Indeed, there is an argument to be made that the Establishment Clause 
questions are particularly well-suited to political resolution because as any 
number of scholars have pointed out, the Establishment Clause is primarily 
a structural provision rather than one, such as the Free Exercise or Free 
Speech Clauses, intended to protect individuals’ rights.126 This is precisely 
why Establishment Clause violations often do not yield plaintiffs with 
standing; but it is also why leaving these issues to the political process is 
not the end of the world.127 Furthermore, Justice Gorsuch makes the fair 
argument that given the sheer number of government religious displays that 
exist throughout our country, there is something to be said for rescuing the 
federal judiciary from this maelstrom.128 This is not to say, of course, that 
structural provisions are never subject to judicial enforcement. When a 
plaintiff with injury in fact and standing does exist, structural provisions 
such as the Appointments Clause129 and the Article I, Section 7 requirements 
of bicameralism and presentment130 can of course be litigated. And so with 
the Establishment Clause. But it does mean that as with all structural 
provisions, not all disputes will necessarily produce a proper plaintiff. 
 
122. See generally Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution, 85 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 407 (2011). 
123. Id. at 410–11, 420–22. 
124. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1968). 
125. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 20, 
1785), in FOUNDERS ONLINE, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-
08-02-0163 [https://perma.cc/A37B-95SH]. 
126. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 61, at 647–48; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 115, at 133–34; 
William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 
66 IND. L.J. 351, 374 (1991); William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing 
Standing and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 231–32, 231 n.115. 
127. For an argument to this effect discussing the American Legion case, see Richard Garnett, 
Symposium: The End of a Walking Dead Doctrine?, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 11, 2018, 1:03 PM), https://w 
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128. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2103 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
129. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 












Another equally important conclusion, however, also flows from the 
above analysis separating the standing and merits questions regarding the 
Establishment Clause. The fact that no plaintiff exists to challenge a 
religious display does not mean, or even imply, that the display is 
constitutional. To the contrary, it might well violate the Establishment 
Clause, and elected and other officials, pursuant to their oath to uphold the 
Constitution, have a clear and unambiguous obligation to consider whether 
that is so (as of course do state court judges, if they are willing to hear 
litigation over these issues). And if those officials conclude that the display 
is unconstitutional, it is their legal and personal obligation, pursuant to their 
oath to uphold the Constitution, to take the display down. 
A brief word on substance. The only substantive reading of the 
Establishment Clause that would find all religious displays to be 
constitutional would be to require legal coercion as a necessary element of 
an Establishment Clause violation, as Justice Thomas proposes in American 
Legion and elsewhere.131 This is certainly not the place to get into the 
endless disputes over the “endorsement” versus “coercion” versus 
“historical” approaches to the Establishment Clause. Suffice to say that the 
Supreme Court rejected Justice Thomas’s proposition as early as 1962 in its 
first school prayer case, Engel v. Vitale,132 for the obvious reason that 
making legal coercion the Establishment Clause “test” makes it duplicative 
of the Free Exercise Clause.133 Justice Thomas’s argument, that because 
historical establishments generally did include an element of coercion, 
coercion is a necessary element of an establishment,134 is a non sequitur. It 
might also be pointed out that Michael McConnell, who did as much as 
anyone to bring the coercion argument to public attention,135 did not argue 
for a coercion test in his Becket Fund amicus brief in American Legion, but 
rather advocated a “historical approach.”136 And to put the icing on the cake, 
even Justice Kennedy, who wrote the original, leading opinion advocating 
a coercion test for the Establishment Clause (in a dissent for four Justices in 
County of Allegheny),137 conceded in that case that the Establishment 
“Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross 
on the roof of city hall.”138 And more recently he repeated that concession, 
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this time joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.139 Yet it is hard 
to see how such a cross would create legal coercion. Thus a true legal-
coercion-only approach to Establishment does not appear to have many 
advocates on the Court or elsewhere, aside from Justice Thomas. 
Of course, the argument presented here suggests that even if Justice 
Kennedy’s Latin cross is unconstitutional, there is no way for a federal court 
to adjudicate that point. That appears to be true, and the constitutional cost 
of standing doctrine. It might be pointed out, however, that if a small, 
religiously homogeneous city did erect a permanent Latin cross on its city 
hall but no one within the city objected, then too there would be no plaintiff 
available, even under a direct contact theory, to challenge the cross. But it 
would remain just as unconstitutional. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS BEYOND RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS 
If the argument made in the previous section is accepted, what are the 
implications for judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause, or more 
broadly of the Constitution, outside the context of religious displays? And 
in particular, does denial of standing in religious display cases spell the 
demise of the Court’s foundational school prayer cases—Engel v. Vitale140 
and School District of Abington Township v. Schempp141—as argued by the 
Law Professors’ amicus brief?142 Justice Gorsuch’s answer is that it would 
not, because the students in those cases were “compelled to recite a 
prayer.”143 And the Becket Fund brief similarly argues, quoting Valley 
Forge, that these cases are unaffected because the students who sued were 
“coercively ‘subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to 
assume special burdens to avoid them.’”144 This, however, moves a little too 
fast. First of all, at first cut it is hard to see the difference between a prayer 
or Bible passage read at one, and a religious display thrust upon one, and in 
particular why the former is “coercive” while the latter is not. Furthermore, 
as the Law Professors Brief noted, in both those cases students were 
permitted to excuse themselves from the readings.145 And finally, as also 
noted in the Law Professors Brief, in both those cases the Court specifically 
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noted that unlike with the Free Exercise Clause, coercion is not a necessary 
element of an Establishment Clause violation.146 
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that standing was proper 
in the school prayer cases. The key insight is that coercion, even if not a 
necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation, is surely sufficient 
to establish injury in fact. To begin with, it should be noted that in Schempp 
(unlike Engel) the Court did specifically address standing in a footnote, 
concluding that the schoolchildren and their parents had standing because 
they were “directly affected by the laws and practices against which their 
complaints are directed.”147 Indeed, in the Suhre case Judge Wilkinson cited 
this passage in Schempp as supporting direct-contact standing.148 But that is 
not a necessary reading of the rather obscure “directly affected” language 
of Schempp. For starters, it takes no leap of imagination to recognize that 
public schools are uniquely coercive environments, both because the state 
compels attendance at schools and because students are children who are 
especially susceptible to both peer pressure, and pressure from school 
officials, including teachers, that the State has placed in authority over 
them.149 Indeed, in the Court’s most important modern school prayer case, 
Lee v. Weisman, the Court specifically relied upon the existence of “subtle 
coercive pressure” and “indirect coercion” on students to strike down state-
sponsored prayers at middle and high school graduations.150 Once a realistic, 
fact-based approach to coercive pressure is taken, there seems no barrier to 
treating that coercion as injury in fact, sufficient to accord standing to 
challenge religious indoctrination of students at public school events.151 Nor 
is it an answer to argue that coercion did not exist because students could 
excuse themselves from participation in school prayers. For one thing, given 
the realities of coercive pressure to conform in school settings, for many 
students the option to excuse themselves is surely illusory. Furthermore, it 
is simply not true that no injury exists if a plaintiff, by taking involuntary 
steps, can avoid that injury. As the Valley Forge Court put it, injury existed 
in Schempp because plaintiffs “were forced to assume special burdens to 
avoid” it.152 In either case—exposure to coercive prayers, or coerced actions 
to avoid the initial coercion—injury exists. Indeed, the Court relied upon 
precisely this reasoning in rejecting the argument in the graduation prayer 
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case that coercion was lacking because attendance at graduations is 
voluntary.153 
The coercion principle alone, if defined realistically, explains then why 
standing poses no barrier to challenging religious exercises in public 
schools. But while coercion explains why students have standing in these 
cases, it does not explain why in Schempp the Court said that parents also 
had standing (aside from their ability to sue on behalf of their children). 
There are, however, good reasons to believe that religious indoctrination in 
public schools injures parents directly. To understand why, it is important 
to bear in mind that since the 1920s, the Court has recognized a substantive 
right on the part of parents to exercise control over the education and 
upbringing of their children.154 In one of those cases, a religious order which 
operated private, religious schools successfully challenged an Oregon law 
requiring attendance at public schools on the grounds that the law “conflicts 
with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive 
appropriate mental and religious training.”155 The clear implication of this 
holding is that parents suffer a cognizable injury in fact when the State 
deprives them of control over their children’s education, especially their 
moral and religious education. 
To recognize such an injury does not, of course, mean that parents will 
succeed in challenging every state action that controls their children’s 
education. The very existence of mandatory school attendance laws, and 
mandatory state educational standards, belies that. But that question goes to 
the merits, not standing. On the merits, then, it is surely constitutional for 
the state to insist that schools, public and private, teach arithmetic. But it 
seems equally obvious that on the merits, government cannot mandate (or 
prohibit, in private schools) religious indoctrination of students. 
Another important consequence follows from this reasoning, which is 
that unlike passive religious displays generally, religious displays in public 
schools, such as the Ten Commandments display in public school 
classrooms challenged in Stone v. Graham,156 may well generate standing 
to challenge them. The reason is not only because such displays impose 
coercive pressure on students to conform (though they surely do), but even 
more so because such displays indoctrinate students on an ongoing basis, 
which clearly injures parents by depriving them of control over their 
children’s religious education. The question then becomes whether a display 
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on the merits violates the Establishment Clause, an issue beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
Indeed, moving beyond the context of public schools, there is no reason 
to believe that rejection of direct-contact standing in religious display cases 
will necessarily have much impact on Establishment Clause litigation more 
generally. For one thing, while schools are the archetypal example of 
inherently coercive atmospheres, they are not unique in that respect. The 
legislative prayers directed at members of the public that the Court upheld 
in Town of Greece v. Galloway,157 for example, surely created a similarly 
coercive environment, especially because some members of the audience 
would have been seeking special dispensations from the very government 
officials leading the prayers. In addition, cases involving selective benefits 
favoring or excluding religious actors could still be litigated by those denied 
the benefit.158 Rejection of direct-contact standing also has no implications 
for the form of taxpayer standing recognized by the Court in Establishment 
Clause cases in Flast v. Cohen.159 Therefore, since most modern 
Establishment Clause cases are litigated based on one of these theories, they 
would remain unaffected by the demise of direct-contact standing. 
There is, however, one area where acceptance of the argument presented 
in this Essay would have a dramatic, limiting effect on standing—but it does 
not involve the Establishment Clause. Rather, it is Equal Protection, and in 
particular the Court’s generous rules regarding standing for plaintiffs 
challenging affirmative action programs. The argument why is simple 
enough. Recall that in cases such as Bakke and Northeastern Florida 
Chapter of Associated General Contractors, the Court granted standing to 
challenge affirmative action programs despite the fact that the plaintiffs in 
those cases were unable to demonstrate that the programs caused them 
tangible loss, because it concluded that the Equal Protection Clause made 
“the denial of equal treatment” a cognizable injury for standing purposes.160 
If, however, we accept the argument made in Part III above (and necessary 
to reject direct-contact standing) that only statutes can create new injuries, 
not the Constitution standing alone, then the Court’s analysis in these cases 
is unsupportable. Plaintiffs challenging affirmative action programs, no less 
than other plaintiffs, must be able to show something beyond the purely 
procedural, ideological injuries they alleged—they must show concrete 
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loss. And that in turn means that both of those cases should have been 
dismissed on justiciability grounds. In short, if the Court is inclined in the 
future to accept Justice Gorsuch’s invitation to reject direct-contact standing 
in religious display cases, if it is to be intellectually consistent it must also 
reject “denial of equal treatment” standing in affirmative action cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Standing is a complex and sometimes seemingly self-contradictory body 
of law. There is also no doubt that the Supreme Court sometimes 
manipulates standing to reach questions it otherwise could not,161 or avoid 
questions it would rather not confront.162 Nonetheless, the modern Court has 
insisted that standing does constitute a body of constitutional law distinct 
from substantive areas such as the Establishment and Equal Protection 
Clauses. And that in turn must mean that the key concept underlying 
standing—injury in fact—has some meaning distinct from the merits 
question in a case. In particular, if we accept standing as a distinct body of 
constitutional law and injury as a distinct concept from the merits, it then 
follows that courts will sometimes be unable to address even gross 
constitutional violations, thereby relegating those issues to constitutional 
politics. In this Essay I have argued that the constitutionality of government 
religious displays, at least outside of the context of public schools, is an 
example of such an issue. It should be emphasized, however, that it is far 
from the only one. Indeed, the Essay concludes with another example of an 
area of limited judicial authority—affirmative action—with a very different 
political valence. Yet no Justice that I am aware of has argued for or against 
finding standing in both religious display and affirmative action cases. As 
constitutional law, it seems fair to insist that standing doctrine conform 
generally to basic rule-of-law values,163 so that when judges deploy standing 
doctrine they do so consistently, no matter whose ox is being gored. 
Whether in our hyperpartisan era the judiciary is capable of doing so is of 
course another question. 
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